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  Pauline von Bonsdorff 
Abstract[1]
Artification is mostly approached from a contextualist
perspective where “art” refers to objects that are presented
and appreciated within socially recognized art institutions. 
Artification then means that the notion of art is extended to
non-art areas.  Yet it can be argued that contextualism is
circular, since it starts with an unquestioned assumption about
what art is.  Another weakness of contextualism is that by
privileging theory it tends to downplay the role of creative and
appreciative practices.  Alternative approaches are possible,
and this article explores in a preliminary way what a naturalist
approach could mean for how we see art and artification
processes.  The naturalist approach developed here considers
the arts first of all as cultural practices that evolve together
with discourse, but where discourse is not privileged over
practice.  As Wittgenstein suggested, understanding (and
skillfully practicing) any art is about socially mediated, long-
term engagement.  By analyzing the evolutionary and onto-
genetic origins of art and its function in all human cultures,
and by describing the criteria of art as a cluster, naturalism
opens the border between art and non-art.  With naturalism,
we can ask whether some of the changes described as
artification allow us to recognize art outside institutionally
legitimized art worlds.  It allows us to ask to what extent
something is art; it provides a perspective where phenomena
can be studied case by case; and it re-introduces the
relevance of evaluative criteria in the process of identifying or
recognizing art.
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artification, contextualism, naturalism, theories of art,
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1.  Introduction
'Artification' suggests that things that have formerly not been
regarded as art have recently started to be seen as art.  As a
descriptive term, it thematizes cultural change of a kind that
is closely related to aestheticization, described by Wolfgang
Welsch as processes whereby “the unaesthetic is made, or
understood to be, aesthetic.”  Welsch points out that this
means different things in different contexts:  beautification,
stylization, virtualization and, in the epistemic sphere, giving
up the search for firm foundations and accepting the relative
and hermeneutic nature of our life-world.[2]  Artification does
not claim quite so much in terms of changes in world-views,
yet it opens a wealth of questions.  Some of them are about
the drivers behind this development:  are they commercial,
educational, critical, artistic, or related to well-being and
quality of life?  Others are about the main areas of artification
and its boundaries, if these can be identified, since a central
feature of artification is that it spreads to ever new non-art
areas like business, healthcare, politics, education, everyday
life, and virtually every sector of society. 
The central question of this article is simpler but perhaps more
fundamental:  Is artification ultimately about extending the
notion of art to non-art areas, thereby transfiguring certain
objects and practices into art; or can at least some of these
changes be better described as recognizing art in areas outside
the institutionally legitimized art worlds?[3]  How we answer
the question has consequences for how we see art in its wider
contexts of human culture and society.  In contemporary
theory of art, there are two main alternatives.  One is
contextualist and historicist, that art is a historical
phenomenon that evolved in the West, and the concept cannot
be applied to objects and practices of other cultures and times
without distorting them.  The other is naturalist, that art is a
universal and central human practice though it takes different
forms in different cultures.
The two alternatives differ fundamentally in how they
understand art and explain its existence, while there is
overlap, not unexpectedly, in the identification of what counts
as art.  Nonetheless, they constitute two alternative
perspectives on what goes on in artification.  It seems that it is
the constructionist-contextualist view that has the upper hand
at the moment.  I am interested, however, in exploring the
naturalist perspective for at least two reasons.  One is to
analyze the suggestion that in artification non-art is made into
art or made art-like.  Can this be taken for granted and what
does it imply?  The other is to explore what a naturalist
approach means for how we see art and artification processes. 
That said, the exploration of the naturalist approach can only
be preliminary.
As a central resource for the critical analysis and naturalist
exploration I use Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late work, which had a
key role in Anglo-American aesthetic theory in the second half
of the twentieth century.  Its effect on philosophy at large is
aptly called the "linguistic turn," but the overall effect on
aesthetics could better be termed contextualist.  It inspired
philosophers and theorists to turn their attention from works
of art to the networks that surround and maintain art,
whether linguistic, pragmatic or institutional, past or present. 
Yet the full implications of Wittgenstein’s thinking for
aesthetics and art may not have been realized.
Two points in particular are relevant.  One is that whereas
Wittgenstein emphasized both how linguistic meaning is
embedded in life-world contexts and language use is itself a
practice, the aesthetic and artistic practices of art makers and
audiences have not received enough attention.  In other
words, if essentialist theories made the mistake of “staring at
an object,”[4] contextualist theories may have made the
mistake of looking away from the object and its micro-
contexts, from how artists and audiences actually engage with
art.  The other point is that Wittgenstein’s suggestion to look
at ordinary language has been somewhat neglected.  There is
not much reflection on what “art” means for amateur art
lovers, people who have a keen interest in art without being
professionally involved in its production or evaluation.  If they
emphasized the aesthetic dimension of contemporary art, what
conclusions should be drawn from this?  Could one say that
they have not grasped what is essential for art today?  But
what are the grounds of such a claim? It seems that the
primacy of a certain kind of art – conceptual – has been taken
for granted, and theory is dependent upon it:  pending on art.
I start by introducing some distinctions that help to
characterize the assumptions, perspectives, and ambitions of
different types of theories of art and sketch their historical
context.  I then read the Philosophical Investigations in the
spirit of an appreciative and critical dialogue and with a view
to its implications for art theory.  Following this, I make some
points about contextualist theories, focusing on Arthur C.
Danto’s “artworld.”  Finally, I suggest how naturalism might
approach contemporary artistic, art educational, and
artification processes.
2.  Approaching art: some rough distinctions
Artification is described as referring to “situations and
processes in which something that is not regarded as art in
the traditional sense of the word is changed into art or into
something art-like.”[5]  Cultural change of the sort described
certainly takes place in many Western societies.  Nonetheless,
the description of artification as an extension of art into non-
art areas is also puzzling since it seems to take for granted,
rather than analyze, the difference between art and non-art. 
One way to highlight this is to focus on the expression
“traditional sense of the word.”  It suggests that art is a social
construct consisting of a group of phenomena which members
of a particular culture just call “art.”  But if this is the case,
there should be no problem if they start calling something that
resembles art “art.”  The extension of the concept grows wider
and the concept itself may undergo some change, but it is a
question of degree rather than of new categories.  Nothing
dramatic happens; there is just more art.
Art “in the traditional sense” is a vague notion with regard to
the plural, even heterogeneous, character of what art has
been in the last centuries, even within Western culture. 
Research on the history of aesthetics and the arts shows that
both the boundaries of art – what objects and practices count
as art at a particular time – and the suggestions about what is
central to art or the arts have varied.[6]  Even “the modern
system of the arts”[7] contains a multitude of artistic practices
and theories that sometimes conflict.  Admittedly a
terminological change took place in the eighteenth century
from arts in the plural to art in the singular.  Larry Shiner
suggests that despite the variety of practices and internal
differences between the “art worlds and subworlds” of the
modern fine arts system, there are shared “underlying
concepts and ideals.”[8]  Yet within the system there are
strong tendencies to broaden the field, to challenge values,
concepts and ideals; to change practices and go outside
institutions.  In fact the very roots of modernism are more
multifarious than the term “modern fine arts system”
suggests.[9]  One can see “artification” within that system,
especially within the tradition of the avant-garde, where one
strong tendency was to claim as art things not formerly
considered art. 
In many ways, actual works of art, even of art “in the
traditional sense,” form a group that is plural rather than
singular.  There are several traditional senses rather than one,
not least from the perspective of how art has been construed
in discourse.  Whether we want to say that the modern system
of fine art is singular or plural is perhaps more a question of
emphasis and perspective than of fact, since facts can be
interpreted in more than one way.  However, if we put a
stronger emphasis on practices than has generally been done,
our conclusions might be different.  I explore this later on.
Let me now turn to the plurality of art theories.[10]  I suggest
that we can make some gross distinctions between theories
with regard to their structure and aims, that is, how they
articulate the question about what art is.  What follows is
meant as a helpful perspective on Western art discourse of the
last quarter millennium.  I suggest that theories differ not only
in the characteristics and functions they claim are central to
art – whether as a totality, or system, as works of art, or
activities – but that they also have different epistemic bases
and aims.[11]  In the past two hundred and fifty years, three
ways of approaching the question of what art is can be
distinguished:  essentialism, contextualism, and naturalism. 
First, by essentialism I mean theory that seeks the key,
distinguishing characteristics of art:  its essence.[12]  This
could refer to its necessary and sufficient properties, terms
used in analytic philosophy, but essentialism does not operate
according to that logic.  Essentialist theories of art are
historically linked to the modern fine arts system, since it is
here that the question of what art is arises.  I suggest that
while some of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century
theories set out to describe the essential characteristics of art,
as of a newly discovered species, there are also theories
whose aim was to establish and defend art as a cultural
practice in bourgeois society.  Essentialism takes for granted
that art exists and has key properties and functions which may
or may not be specific to a time.  The question is one of
finding and naming them, not of giving a logical definition of
art.  Furthermore, the normative character of these theories
does not result from a naïve conflation between the
classificatory and evaluative sense of ‘art,’ since art is here as
a value concept throughout.
Contextualist theories of art evolved in the second half of the
twentieth century and were preoccupied with defining art
through finding its necessary and sufficient properties.  There
was a new emphasis on the historical, time- and place-specific
character of art:  art can be defined only relative to and in a
certain situation.  As theorists agreed that essentialism had
failed to specify the distinguishing properties of works of art,
proponents of contextualist theories turned their eyes, on the
one hand, to discourses and thinking about art, exemplified by
Arthur C. Danto, and, on the other hand, to practices of
making, presenting and appreciating art, exemplified by
George Dickie.  The dominant view was that art is a culturally
constructed phenomenon the existence of which is contingent. 
The definition of art was also disconnected from
evaluation.[13]  Despite this, contextualist theories often take
the existence of art for granted in ways that I try to indicate in
section 4, below.
Finally, the third approach is naturalism.  It is connected to a
scientific worldview that places humans within the context of
nature, natural sciences, and the philosophy of nature. 
Naturalist theories of art are found in the early twentieth
century and, with new impulses from evolutionary, cognitive,
and infant research, in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries.[14]  They typically see art as fulfilling
evolutionary and cultural functions that are necessary for a
thriving society and a good life.  The approach claims that art
is a universal and not a uniquely Western phenomenon.[15] 
That art exists in all human cultures and has biological roots,
as well as existential and social import, does not however
mean that all art is alike, any more than cultures or languages
are.  The aim of naturalist theories is often explanation:
 whether of how art evolved in human prehistory; of its
ontogenesis in early childhood; or of its cognitive and
communicative functions.  Naturalist theories are typically not
naïve about the existence of art; on the contrary they are
sensitive to the border areas where art arises from or touches
non-art.[16]  As they tend to discuss the function of art, there
is an inherent normativity to the concept of art, much like in
essentialism.
A further distinction will be useful as I proceed.  This is one
between approaching art as objects on the one hand and as
activities or practices, whether productive or receptive, on the
other.[17]  Although essentialist theory did not exclude
activities, for example, the artist in Romantic art theory, in the
course of the twentieth century it increasingly focused on
objects or works of art.  Contextualist definitions of art discuss
both artworks (objects) and the institutional practices that
surround art but tend to overlook human agency at work in
making and experiencing art.[18]  Naturalism, in comparison,
shows considerable interest in the activity of making art and
the experience of art probably because it is interested in the
role of art in human life.
3.  Practicing language, practicing art
Wittgenstein’s statement that in order to understand the
meaning of a word we should look at how it is used,
emphasizes how language is embedded in practices.  This
evidently means that the meaning of words arises in the
practice of language but, in addition, Wittgenstein suggested
that the practice of language (speaking) is part of other
activities or life-forms.[19]  This dimension has not been fully
developed in contextualist or other theories of art.[20]  In my
view, it contributes to naturalist theory.  I shall now discuss
implications of Wittgenstein’s thinking for our understanding of
art from two angles:  the idea that language is in some sense
an environment or space that we inhabit; and the somewhat
overlooked dimension of “play” in Spiel, which has usually
been translated as ”game.”
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein compared
language to a landscape or an old city.[21]  It is obvious that
these metaphors do not refer to landscape as a view or picture
that we inspect but to a space in which the “draughtsman”
moves.  Similarly, when learning deictic terms, such as “there”
or “this,” what is realized is not only spatial relations outside
language but a spatiality within language.[22]  Therefore, we
do not primarily use language as a tool to describe our
thoughts and our world; language rather articulates where we
stand, what we are, and what we think on a more basic level. 
Further, as language is inseparable from our life-world at
large, it articulates our world together with other practices or
life-forms, in a relationship of co-constitution. 
Regarding language as a practice, Wittgenstein observed that
a child learns a language by training, not through
explanation.[23]  Verbal meaning is intimate; we rely on
language, even live it.[24]  This is not to say that linguistic
meaning is innate or non-arbitrary; languages are different
and words have different connotations for different people. 
Our mother tongue is “second nature” to us, something we
trust and that is inseparable from our world, articulating it and
enabling us to articulate ourselves.[25]  Yet while our
thoughts are dependent on language, Wittgenstein showed
that they are not identical with it.  We can cope with language
even when concepts are not exactly defined, and there are
cases when we can alter the rules “as we go along.”[26]  Such
uncertainty could hardly be tolerable if language itself were the
only ground of verbal communication.
Also the vocal gestures that are part of speech foreground the
intimate relation between agency and meaning.[27] 
Wittgenstein showed us a line of nonsensical scribble and
asked the reader to read it out loud as if it were a sentence. 
When we “read” the scribble, he suggested, we do not feel that
the sounds we produce are caused by the line in the way we
do when we read a normal sentence.[28]  However, one might
say that we establish the connection when reading the
scribble.  The sounds are initially contingent but, in retrospect,
their connection to the scribble is constituted through our
agency as we playact reading.
I now come to the second theme, namely Wittgenstein’s use
of Spiel.  It can be translated as either play or game but has
no single equivalent in English.  Wittgenstein’s original Spiel is
translated and discussed in the English-language secondary
literature mainly as game.  Yet, in some passages of the
Investigations, the aspect of play is evident.  My suggestion is
not that we should replace ‘game’ with ‘play’; rather, it is
important to keep the full semantic field in mind and see
which meaning fits case by case.  To start, there are significant
differences between game and play.  Play allows for more
spontaneity, it is less controlled by rules, and less rational. 
When we play games, we do more than perform according to
rules.  Also, play, in general, is less competitive than games,
and there is a deeper degree of interaction in play as
compared to games.[29]  Finally, while ‘game’ suggests an
entity with clear borders, an object of sorts, play is more
dynamic and open-ended.  Play suggests playing:  an activity. 
Spiele are the central examples in Wittgenstein’s exposition of
family resemblances.[30]  He suggested that while different
games have no single shared property, there is a connecting
network of properties, each of which is shared by some games
rather than by all.  One of his examples is a child who throws
a ball against the wall.  Clearly this is more about playing than
a game; the activity, not a set of rules, is foregrounded.  But
we could think similarly of the other examples, bearing in mind
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the social constitution of
language.  If “[s]hared human behavior is the system of
reference by means of which we interpret an unknown
language,”[31] then language-games and life-forms can
hardly be understood from a third-person perspective.  Our
participatory experience is crucial for understanding what is
common to different Spiele.  It is not enough, after all, to just
“look and see.”[32]
The dimension of shared human behavior may need to be
better articulated if we are to fully realize the social character
of meaning.[33]  My suggestion is that meaning is confirmed
but also established and changed in actual situations of
exchange, where a certain fuzziness or flexibility of words and
concepts is even necessary for new insights to arise. 
Intentions need to be recognized in order to become real,
much like humor, the existence of which depends on its being
appreciated by others.  To understand a joke, we cannot just
look and see; we have to share and participate in a situation. 
In his observations on aesthetic matters, Wittgenstein often
brought up this dimension of intersubjectivity.  The suggestion
that “custom and upbringing have a hand in” why a style of
painting is understood by some but not by all points to the
importance of growing into aesthetic and artistic practices.[34]
A consequence of Wittgenstein’s thought is that what
something is cannot be understood by verbal means only. 
Language is, and has to be, in touch with a world.  It is highly
doubtful that we could explain what art is to someone who had
no experience of similar practices.  It is the participatory
knowledge of life practices and agency that makes verbal
communication possible.  Furthermore, it must be emphasized
that learning a language and becoming familiar with practices
and life-foms are social processes.  Language is initially
shared.  Even in talking to oneself ”we” are involved.  “How
should I think” implies “how should one think,” which implies
“how should we think.”  And the meaning of utterances shifts
only relative to a group of speakers; meaning has to be
recognized in order to exist.
The main implication for art is that the language-game of art
is much more intimately embedded in actual life-forms and
practices than most contextualist theories recognize.  Another
thing to note is that Wittgenstein privileged actual, ordinary
language use.  This suggests that, in studying the language-
games and life-forms of art, we should take a broad rather
than a narrow view, including how the word ‘art’ circulates in
the worlds of non-professional audiences and amateur artists
rather than focusing merely on critics, theorists, professional
artists’ and other insiders’ discourse.  Much of today’s theory
and philosophy of art is a rather narrowly specialized
language-game.  ‘Art’ may mean something different within
this game than outside it.  This again actualizes the question
of on what grounds we can decide which view is right, if it is
only a question of discourse.
Wittgenstein’s philosophy gave important impulses to
aesthetics and art theory from the 1950s onwards.  While
theorists influenced by him may disagree on many issues, in
general the linguistic turn has led to a situation where
contextualism is dominant; furthermore, it is a contextualism
that emphasizes discourses and thinking rather than
practices.  In theorizing, art is looked upon from an observer’s
rather than a participant’s perspective.[35] 
4.  The philosophy game of art
During the first half of the twentieth century essentialist
theories of art turned increasingly towards the work of art,
thus marginalizing production and reception in their attempts
to find out what distinguishes art from non-art.  But this kind
of theory reached an impasse as various art movements
seemed to constantly challenge and even falsify the definitions
that had been proposed.  This prepared the ground for turning
the attention from the art objects towards their contexts. 
Wittgenstein’s late philosophy was of crucial importance in this
development.[36]  The general outcome was that philosophers
interested in how art can be defined turned from works of art
towards contexts and tradition.  This way of approaching art
has since been dominant.
The most influential theoretical contribution was Arthur C.
Danto’s introduction of the artworld.[37]  Danto’s own
understanding of this concept is basically philosophical and
historical. ‘Artworld’ refers to the prevailing way of
understanding art in a particular epoch.  The artworld is
inseparably part of art and is an explanatory concept:
To see something as art at all demands nothing less
than this, an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge
of the history of art.  Art is the kind of thing that
depends for its existence upon theories … the artworld is
logically dependent upon theory.[38]
In distinction to Wittgenstein’s model, where language and
other practices are interdependent, works of art are here
unidirectionally dependent on theory.  As B. R. Tilghman
wrote, Danto’s artworld “is entirely a linguistic entity made up
of all the things we say, the theories, interpretations, and
descriptions of art available to us.”[39]  Although what exactly
“theory” means may to some extent be open, the emphasis
seems to be on disciplinary expertise and conscious reflection. 
The “art world” is different from the ordinary one; it is a world
of “interpreted things.”[40]  Another notable feature is that
the question of what art is is formulated as a question about
which objects, or things, should be included in the category. 
This makes the definition exclusive; artworks are strictly
separated from non-art objects.  With respect to the tradition
of artistic and aesthetic theory, this strategy narrows the
approach by neglecting theories that have focused on creation
or reception.  Mimesis or expression, to name but two
traditional core concepts of essentialist approaches, are
ambiguous in this respect; they can refer to production, the
object, or appreciation.
Danto’s constructionist theory singles out reflection as a
central feature of contemporary art.  But, at the same time, it
operates on the assumption of a certain kind of art typical of
the art scene and markets of international metropoles, most
notably New York.  In this respect, there is a lack of reflection. 
The claim that “the definition of art has become part of the
nature of art in a very explicit way”[41] makes sense against
the background of dominant art discourses of the visual arts of
the twentieth century.  But does this yield a representative
image of all the art even of that time?  More importantly, does
the theory even address this matter?  Problems that need
more thorough discussion are related to discourse: to the
discrepancies between the dominant art discourse and art
practices; to the sometimes polemical character of art
discourse; and to the circularity of art theory.[42]  
Another problem is related to the aesthetic dimension of art. 
Danto deemed aesthetic properties irrelevant for whether a
thing is art or not, which is slightly paradoxical as he also
emphasized that a work of art "embodies its meaning."[43]
 Yet aesthetic considerations remain paramount in discussions
and decisions about admissions to art schools, in art criticism,
and in decisions about funding and acquisition of works to
collections.  This is true for all art forms and in professional
and amateur contexts alike.  Assessed within this larger frame,
there is circularity and limitations to how well contextualist
theory reflects practice.[44]
There exists yet another interpretation of the artworld that, on
the face of it, deals exactly with practices.  This is the
sociologically inclined tradition inspired by Danto but developed
by George Dickie and others.[45]  Here, the art world (or
worlds) is understood as a set of institutions that organize the
production and reception of art.  However, this research does
not look very much into what actually takes place in individual
and social processes of making and appreciating art.
The linguistic turn in aesthetics meant a departure from
essentialist definitions and their alleged focus on the
properties of a work of art towards the way we speak about
art, but not towards the practices whereby we engage with it. 
On the whole, it seems that contextualist theory is unable to
answer in a more holistic way questions about the role and
character of art in contemporary society.  Perhaps it does not
aim to do so, its context being limited in advance.  In a
discussion about artification, this limitation is a weakness since
artification draws attention precisely to wider contexts.  My
hunch is that a naturalist theory can better account for present
changes in the arts; at least it does not prima facie deny the
artistic relevance of phenomena outside the established art
world.
5.   The naturalist perspective:  art and non-art in the
borderland
What if art is not just a culturally contingent set of traditions
but has a natural basis as well?  I am not claiming that it is
only natural; rather, I suggest that a contextualist and
relativist understanding is insufficient.  I would now like to
suggest how naturalism can engage with practices that exist
on the fringes of established art institutions and what it means
for our interpretation of artification.  But first I want to make
some additional theoretical points.
As mentioned above, the naturalist approach is connected to a
scientific and broadly evolutionary worldview.  Rather than
deciding in detail the contents of any theory, this is the frame
within which human culture, including art, is seen, much as a
Christian worldview framed classical German aesthetics.  In
the naturalist perspective, the creation of art, not just culture
in the broad sense, is typical for human beings.  Evolutionary
naturalism argues that aesthetic and artistic, or proto-artistic,
activities added to the chances of survival of individuals and
groups, and the existence of art in all human cultures is
therefore no coincidence.[46]  This argument about the
centrality of art in human life does not implicate
reductionism.[47]  Aesthetic inquiry becomes reductionist only
when experimental research or evolutionary hypotheses are
presented as all that can and needs to be said about the
topic.[48]  In any naturalist or evolutionary theory of art
worthy of that name, art itself must hold the center stage.
Broad naturalism, or “naturalism of second nature,”[49] is
congruent with the views of thinkers such as John Dewey and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  Neither considered nature as opposed
to humankind or culture, and both emphasized the continuity
between life and mind, psychology and philosophy, and
pleasure and value.[50]  As for Wittgenstein, his emphasis on
the difference between natural science, on the one hand, and
philosophy, morality, and the arts, on the other, seemingly
makes it difficult to connect him to naturalism.  Yet he is also
an important resource in any effort to naturalize art without
reducing its meaning and complexity.  Wittgenstein showed
how grasping the meaning and nuances of art involves a tacit
knowing that we grow into through participating in a
culture.[51]  In this understanding, art and the aesthetic are
areas where many things are shared and pointed to through
language, but essential qualities and meanings escape prosaic
formulation. 
The naturalist approach gives equal attention to artistic
activities and works of art, and it starts by looking at art in the
contexts of human life rather than within an art world that is
separate from the everyday life-world.  Contemporary
naturalist theories also emphasize the difference between the
arts in different cultures.  The main idea is that art exists in all
cultures, not that it is always of a particular form.  Dutton
gave a list of twelve criteria that, taken together, indicate that
something is art or close to art.[52]  Some of these are
qualities of works, whether physical pieces or performances;
some characterize the reception of art (criticism, traditions,
and institutions); others indicate the possibility of a particular
kind of experience that is pleasurable and imaginative and
holds intellectual challenge.  Dissanayake emphasized the
emotional, social, and transcendental functions of art.[53]
 Contemporary naturalist theories of art thus emphasize rather
than downplay art’s reflective, existential, and social
dimensions.
A major asset of naturalism is that it enables us to handle the
question of whether something is art in a non-exclusive way. 
Instead of a separating borderline between art and non-art, it
establishes a border area that is open on each side and
mediates the relationship between things that are clearly art
and those that are clearly not art.  It allows the existence of a
large group of phenomena with art-typical properties and non-
art properties.  In a naturalist perspective, the phenomena of
artification belong primarily in this borderland.
Let me now briefly sketch how naturalism might deal with
some areas of artification, starting with tendencies in
contemporary art and then moving to areas that are primarily
not art but where art has been introduced either in the form of
practices or as a concept.  As these areas are primarily about
bringing art into social contexts or transforming processes
through art, my emphasis will be on the quality of engagement
and the level of participation rather than on properties of art
objects.  This emphasis on embeddedness and relationships,
whether of art to contexts or of audiences and artists to art, is
in line with Wittgenstein’s idea that forms of expression are
intrinsically linked with life-forms, with specific cultural
contexts.
There is a wide range of phenomena and practices of art in the
present, ranging from traditional art forms, such as the novel,
oil painting, and classical music, to more recent and often
performance- rather than object-centered art forms, such as
performance art, community art, or improvisation theater, to
name just a few.  The latter have challenged earlier views of
art in many ways.  Activist, environmental, and community art
have extended the domain of art by introducing art in non-art
contexts and merging it with activities that are not art.  What
has been radical is not the conquering of new physical spaces
so much as the way art has touched upon everyday life and
work.  In dialogical or relational art, the artist may invite the
audience into a process where the responsibility and
authorship of the work is shared, one consequence being that
the work is more of a process, performance, or duration than
a fixed object.  Art may take on a political role in new ways
and also operate from within the institutional spaces of
politics.  In a discussion of artification, it is important to
remember that these tendencies have evolved over time and
from within the art world, already beginning in the avant-
garde of the early twentieth century.[54]  Probably because of
this their status as art, although discussed and seen by some
as problematic, has not been seriously challenged by
theorists.[55]
Art education, in many of its present forms, comes close to
process-oriented or relational art.  Today art education
comprises not just educating people into practicing the arts or
appreciating art but also the use of artistic or arts-based
methods in various contexts of education, social work,
healthcare, or business, sometimes but not always with
predefined therapeutic or educational goals and often not only
with people who are socially marginalized or have special
needs.[56]  Artists are often involved in these projects but
similar methods are used by persons who are not professional
artists.  Whenever we speak about art education, it seems
evident that the object of that activity is art, whether the
activity is teaching appreciation or making art.  This leaves
open the question how valuable it is as art.  Here we can note
that, since the naturalist cluster criteria of art are evaluative,
naturalism brings back normativity and aesthetics into the
center of art theory.[57]  Similar criteria can be used in
discussing how to look at and analyze instances of artification. 
The procedure would be to start by looking closely at the
phenomenon:  what it is and how it functions in its context,
and then reflect upon whether it is a weak or strong case of
art or perhaps not art at all. 
Before looking more closely at some cases, it should be noted
that institutional criteria no longer apply.  First, the question of
whether the maker of art is a professional or an amateur is
not relevant.  Art can be made by people who have not been
part of the publicly recognized art worlds, such as theaters,
the film industry, music production, or art schools.  On the
other hand, naturalism emphasizes that art is a social,
historical, collective enterprise, and in this it differs from the
romantic idea of art as springing directly from the expressive
needs of an individual.  While naturalism broadens the sphere
of art-making outside a circle of professionals, it does not
suggest that anyone can become an artist instantly, without
some training and context.  Yet if humans have an inclination
to make art, we can expect that it evolves in different places
and various ways, including outside the institutional art
worlds. 
Health care and social work are areas where several art
projects have been launched in the Nordic countries in recent
decades.  Art and culture are believed to have good effects on
well-being and empowerment, and there is research to support
this.[58]  The best way to understand the potential of art in
such contexts might be to highlight individual projects.  The
Finnish actor Jussi Lehtonen toured with a play based on
Shakespeare’s sonnets of love to social and healthcare
institutions during 2006–2010.[59]  The reception was mostly
warm, the identification strong, and the response direct even
when some of the audience did not understand the play.  This
indicates that the capacity to communicate through art, to
share feelings, and to respond is partly independent of our
rational capacities, which is what naturalism would suggest. 
The universal and recognizable theme of love made it easy to
relate to the play, which met the existential challenge of
dealing with central human themes.[60]  In addition, the
performance was a means for some members of the audience
to reactivate their earlier relationship to art.
There is a wealth of other projects introducing art in
healthcare institutions, from concerts to story-crafting and
hospital clowns.  Qualities that seem to be present in such
situations include the sharing and articulation of feeling
(individual or collective); possibilities of individual expression,
recognition, and achievement; imaginative experience; and
even transcendence.  It is useful to remember that for the
most part we do not know what goes on in the audience’s
mind.  However, the naturalist recognition of proto-aesthetic
and -artistic agency in early childhood, and the claim that art
is deeply embedded in our mental structure gives more weight
to such experiences than an intellectual understanding of art
which assumes that the route to art necessarily passes
through theory.
In educational contexts, such as schools and museums, art
may be introduced for its own sake to give people access to
art but also in order to increase social well-being or improve
learning.[61]  It seems that when the instrumental function
becomes dominant, there is a risk that the artistic part
diminishes.  This may not be intentional.  Rather, it might be
caused by streamlining the arts-based methods with the result
that they can no longer fully address the individual and
contextual complexity of a situation.  The more fixed the
method is, the less it gives room for participating individuals to
influence and actively form what takes place.  Although the
uses of art are manifold, its potential in institutional settings
seems to be linked to its very strangeness, the fact that it
represents a different way of thinking and being as compared
to the ordinary.  In addition, the duration and continuity of
projects are also important, as reflective and creative
engagement takes time to develop. 
The audiences of art have not been much discussed by art
theory.  Yet the ultimate reason why art institutions exist in
contemporary society is that people enjoy art:  they visit
exhibitions, buy books, go to the cinema, and dwell on their
experiences.[62]  This fundamental human interest in the arts
gives private and public funders reason to support the arts. 
Art is not maintained arbitrarily; there are active art audiences
with appreciative skills.  One consequence of the cross-over
from art to non-art contexts is that the audience increasingly
encounters works that are made by artists but do not wear the
label art.  This may lower the threshold for considering works
that do not come from the art world to be art.  The naturalist
perspective permits us to think that in encountering an
arresting piece of graffiti or a virtuoso storyteller, we may
legitimately recognize this as an instance of art, or almost art,
as a skillful, imaginatively rich achievement that calls for a
reflective response that may be rewarding.  In pondering
whether something is art, we usually do not invoke theories of
the art world; rather, we recall our previous experiences of art
and dwell on the aesthetic qualities of the object.  Such a
response may arise in any context, and the outcome can be
positive or negative.  In either case, we rely on aesthetic
judgment and argument that are informed by a socially and
pragmatically constituted understanding of art rather than just
a discursive one.  For naturalism, the difference between
seeing something as art and giving it the status of art is not
crucial.  If an artifact is worth seeing as art, then we may have
good reason to say that it is art.
My intention in the foregoing has not been to deny that
artification, or the open borderland between art and non-art,
can be problematic for art.  Applying the term ‘art’ without
caution can backfire on art by suggesting that it is everywhere
and something anyone can do.  This is not the naturalist view. 
In addition, art is sometimes introduced in inappropriate
contexts or for inappropriate reasons, as when a company
planning to fire part of the staff invites an improvisation
theater group in order to make things more pleasant.[63]
 This is worlds apart from the potentially positive effects of
long-term engagement with the arts for fostering creative
thinking in business or science.[64]  In addition to its obvious
unethical character, the problem with the example is that the
project remained separate, even positively irrelevant to its
context, disconnected in a way that would rather hinder
engagement and experience.  The question of whether we
should call something art is, however, also political.  Often to
grant a piece the status of art or a person the status of artist
is to increase their cultural standing.  On the other hand, the
reasons to keep the gates of the art world shut do not always
stem from a concern for quality; they may also arise from a
concern about prestige and money.[65]
Naturalism does not offer a univocal answer to what
'artification' means.  It suggests that, among the phenomena
covered by this term, some may indeed be cases of calling
non-art art.  In other cases, introducing art may lead to a
situation where it takes hold and starts to grow.  This does not
transform a non-art practice into art but it may secure a space
for art or something art-like within that practice.  In a third
group of cases, there might be recognition that art of some
kind is already in place.  Naturalism suggests that, however we
want to see these cases, they are about more than a change
of terminology.  The understanding of what art is may always
be in a state of change if novelty and creativity are among its
central features.[66]  The fear that art dissolves into the
everyday is unfounded from a naturalist understanding, since
its starting point is that the specificity of art is a given,
although at the same time relative to culture.  Art is not
independent of economic pressure, political decisions, social
structures and educational resources, but it is resistant to
them.
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